Philosophy

Argues that Bayesian frameworks dissolve rather than solve traditional philosophical problems, including Gettier cases and Hume's problem of induction. A systematic application of probabilistic reasoning to longstanding epistemological debates.

Argues that the Bayesian polarization literature asked the wrong question. "How can rational agents diverge given common evidence?" presupposes common evidence — but partisan media ecosystems violate this premise at scale. The convergence theorems fail not because of subtle cognitive mechanisms but because their central assumption is empirically false. Twenty years of cognitive interventions failed because they target the wrong failure mode.

Proposes updateability — the capacity of a theory to be meaningfully revised in light of new evidence — as a criterion for demarcating science from non-science, offering an alternative to falsifiability.

Applies graduated Bayesian credences about moral status to generate graduated protections, offering a framework that dissolves the binary framing of the abortion debate.